I have no formal statement, Mr. Chairman,

other than to acknowledge once again your efforts to enlighten our

country and this institution on some of the most critical policy

issues that we are dealing with.

I appreciate, as you have noted, our witnesses and their service

to our country and look forward to their testimony. Thank you.

Secretary Kelly, welcome. Mr. DeTrani, thank you for appearing

this morning.

The first question. Do you believe the U.S. Presidential election

has any influence or bearing on the willingness of North Korea to

negotiate or come to any agreements?

Thank you.

How big a part is human rights in the process? You have mentioned

it a couple of times in your remarks in response to the previous

questions. Centerpiece of negotiation, part of many dynamics?

Where would you put human rights?

How stable do you think Kim Jong-il’s regime is?

What lessons do you think, if you think there

are any lessons, that we can learn or apply from Iraq to our current

dealings with North Korea?

What lessons, if any, do you think the North Koreans

have taken from the current situation in Iraq? Start with our

invasion of Iraq. Do you think that has an effect on their negotiating

position, how they see the world, how they see the United

States?

Do you see a role for the United Nations in the

negotiations in North Korea? And the next follow-on question

would be, is there a role anywhere in the near future in North

Korea for the United Nations?

You mentioned some of the conditions regarding

North Korea’s nuclear capacity and verification you have mentioned

a couple of times obviously is a key component. Is it your

sense that we, in fact, can design a verifiable monitoring regime for

North Korea? I assume it is, and if you could elaborate on that.

By the way, Mr. DeTrani, if you have any comments on this, you

are welcome to join in.

Well, that is obviously why I asked the question

because you have just said it and we all understand it, and this

is the real world. It seems to me this is a key component of anything,

and it is probably the most difficult component. The reality

of it is something I know you are dealing with, and Mr. DeTrani

is going to amplify on your points.

But I think the more we all can understand this and where we

are going, it not only deals with an expectation dynamic—that is

part of, I think, our problem that we have today in Iraq—but expectations

are important not only to the people who live there, but

the guarantor of a country’s security like we are right now in Iraq.

What did we expect 15 months ago where we are today? Now is the

time to lay that out as much as we can in our dealings with North

Korea, which you know I know, Mr. Secretary.